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Abstract
We compute the channel capacity of non-binary fingerprinting under the Marking Assumption, in the
limit of large coalition size c. The solution for the binary case was found by Huang and Moulin. They
showed that asymptotically, the capacity is 1/(c22 ln 2), the interleaving attack is optimal and the arcsine
distribution is the optimal bias distribution.
In this paper we prove that the asymptotic capacity for general alphabet size q is (q − 1)/(c22 ln q). Our
proof technique does not reveal the optimal attack or bias distribution. The fact that the capacity is an
increasing function of q shows that there is a real gain in going to non-binary alphabets.
1 Introduction
1.1 Collusion resistant watermarking
Watermarking provides a means for tracing the origin and distribution of digital data. Before
distribution of digital content, the content is modified by applying an imperceptible watermark
(WM), embedded using a watermarking algorithm. Once an unauthorized copy of the content is
found, it is possible to trace those users who participated in its creation. This process is known
as ‘forensic watermarking’. Reliable tracing requires resilience against attacks that aim to remove
the WM. Collusion attacks, where several users cooperate, are a particular threat: differences
between their versions of the content tell them where the WM is located. Coding theory has
produced a number of collusion-resistant codes. The resulting system has two layers: The coding
layer determines which message to embed and protects against collusion attacks. The underlying
watermarking layer hides symbols of the code in segments1 of the content. The interface between
the layers is usually specified in terms of the Marking Assumption, which states that the colluders
are able to perform modifications only in those segments where they received different WMs.
These segments are called detectable positions.
Many collusion resistant codes have been proposed in the literature. Most notable is the Tardos
code [13], which achieves the asymptotically optimal proportionality m ∝ c2, with m the code
length. Tardos introduced a two-step stochastic procedure for generating binary codewords: (i) For
each segment a bias is randomly drawn from some distribution F . (ii) For each user independently,
a 0 or 1 is randomly drawn for each segment using the bias for that segment. This construction
was generalized to larger alphabets in [14].
1.2 Related work: channel capacity
In the original Tardos scheme [13] and many later improvements and generalisations (e.g. [16,
14, 3, 10, 9, 4, 15, 17]), users are found to be innocent or guilty via an ‘accusation sum’, a
sum of weighted per-segment contributions, computed for each user separately. The discussion
of achievable performance was greatly helped by the onset of an information-theoretic treatment
1 The ‘segments’ are defined in a very broad sense. They may be coefficients in any representation of the content
(codec).
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of anti-collusion codes. The whole class of bias-based codes can be treated as a maximin game
between the watermarker and the colluders [2, 8, 7], independently played for each segment,
where the payoff function is the mutual information between the symbols x1, . . . , xc handed to the
colluders and the symbol y produced by them. In each segment (i.e. for each bias) the colluders
try to minimize the payoff function using an attack strategy that depends on the (frequencies of
the) received symbols x1, . . . , xc. The watermarker tries to maximize the average payoff over the
segments by setting the bias distribution F .
It was conjectured [7] that the binary capacity is asymptotically given by 1/(c22 ln 2). The con-
jecture was proved in [1, 6]. Amiri and Tardos [1] developed an accusation scheme (for the binary
case) where candidate coalitions get a score related to the mutual information between their
symbols and y. This scheme achieves capacity but is computationally very expensive. Huang
and Moulin [6] proved for the large-c limit (in the binary case) that the interleaving attack and
Tardos’s arcsine distribution are optimal.
1.3 Contributions and outline
We prove for alphabet size q that the asymptotic fingerprinting capacity is q−1c22 ln q . Our proof makes
use of the fact that the value of the maximin game can be found by considering the minimax game
instead (i.e. in the reverse order). This proof does not reveal the asymptotically optimal collusion
strategy and bias distribution of the maximin game.
In Section 2 we introduce notation, discuss the information-theoretic payoff game and present
lemmas that will be used later. In Section 3 we analyze the properties of the payoff function in
the large-c limit. We solve the minimax game in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the benefits of
larger alphabets.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We use capital letters to represent random variables, and lowercase letters to their realizations.
Vectors are denoted in boldface and the components of a vector x are written as xi. The expec-
tation over a random variable X is denoted as EX . The mutual information between X and Y is
denoted by I(X ;Y ), and the mutual information conditioned on a third variable Z by I(X ;Y |Z).
The base-q logarithm is written as logq and the natural logarithm as ln. If p and σ are two
vectors of length n then by pσ we denote
∏n
i=1 p
σi
i . If c is a positive integer and σ is a vector of
length n of nonnegative integers with sum equal to c then
(
c
σ
)
denotes the multinomial coefficient
c!
σ1!σ2!...σn!
. The standard Euclidean norm of a vector x is denoted by ‖x‖. The Kronecker delta of
two variables α and β is denoted by δαβ . A sum over all possible outcomes of a random variable
X is denoted by
∑
x. In order not to clutter up the notation we will often omit the set to which
x belongs when it is clear from the context.
2.2 Fingerprinting with per-segment symbol biases
Tardos [13] introduced the first fingerprinting scheme that achieves optimality in the sense of
having the asymptotic behavior m ∝ c2. He introduced a two-step stochastic procedure for
generating the codeword matrix X . Here we show the generalization to non-binary alphabets
[14]. A Tardos code of length m for a number of users n over the alphabet Q of size q is a set
of n length-m sequences of symbols from Q arranged in an n × m matrix X . The codeword
for a user i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is the i-th row in X . The symbols in each column j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} are
generated in the following way. First an auxiliary bias vector P (j) ∈ [0, 1]q with ∑
α
P
(j)
α = 1
is generated independently for each column j, from a distribution F . (The P (j) are sometimes
referred to as ‘time sharing’ variables.) The result p(j) is used to generate each entry Xij of
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column j independently: P [Xij = α] = p
(j)
α . The code generation has independence of all columns
and rows.
2.3 The collusion attack
Let the random variable Σ
(j)
α ∈ {0, 1, . . . , c} denote the number of colluders who receive the symbol
α in segment j. It holds that
∑
α σ
(j)
α = c for all j. From now on we will drop the segment index
j, since all segments are independent. For given p, the vector Σ is multinomial-distributed,
Λσ|p , Prob[Σ = σ|P = p] =
(
c
σ
)
pσ. (1)
The colluders’ goal is to produce a symbol Y that does not incriminate them. It has been shown
that it is sufficient to consider a probabilistic per-segment (column) attack which does not distin-
guish between the different colluders. Such an attack then only depends on Σ, and the strategy
can be completely described by a set of probabilities θy|σ ∈ [0, 1], which are defined as:
θy|σ , Prob[Y = y | Σ = σ]. (2)
For all σ, conservation of probability gives
∑
y θy|σ = 1. Due to the Marking Assumption, σα = 0
implies θα|σ = 0 and σα = c implies θα|σ = 1. The so called interleaving attack is defined as
θα|σ = σα/c.
2.4 Collusion channel and fingerprinting capacity
The attack can be interpreted as a noisy channel with input Σ and output Y . A capacity for
this channel can then be defined, which gives an upper bound on the achievable code rate of a
reliable fingerprinting scheme. The first step of the code generation, drawing the biases p, is not
considered to be a part of the channel. The fingerprinting capacity Cc(q) for a coalition of size c
and alphabet size q is equal to the optimal value of the following two-player game:
Cc(q) = max
F
min
θ
1
c
I(Y ;Σ | P ) = max
F
min
θ
1
c
∫
F (p)I(Y ;Σ | P = p)dqp. (3)
Here the information is measured in q-ary symbols. Our aim is to compute the fingerprinting
capacity Cc(q) in the limit (n→∞, c→∞).
2.5 Alternative mutual information game
The payoff function of the game (3) is the mutual information I(Y ;Σ | P ). It is convex in θ (see
e.g. [5]) and linear in F . This allows us to apply Sion’s minimax theorem (Lemma 1), yielding
max
F
min
θ
I(Y ;Σ | P ) = min
θ
max
F
I(Y ;Σ | P ) (4)
= min
θ
max
p
I(Y ;Σ | P = p) (5)
where the last equality follows from the fact that the maximization over F in (4) results in a
delta distribution located at the maximum of the payoff function. The game (3) is what happens
in reality, but by solving the alternative game (5) we will obtain the asymptotic fingerprinting
capacity.
2.6 Useful Lemmas
The following lemmas will prove useful for our analysis of the asymptotic fingerprinting game.
Lemma 1 (Sion’s minimax theorem [12]): Let X be a compact convex subset of a linear topological
space and Y a convex subset of a linear topological space. Let f : X × Y → R be a function with
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• f(x, ·) upper semicontinuous and quasiconcave on Y, ∀x ∈ X
• f(·, y) lower semicontinuous and quasi-convex on X , ∀y ∈ Y
then minx∈X maxy∈Y f(x, y) = maxy∈Y minx∈X f(x, y).
Lemma 2: Let M be a real n × n matrix. Then MTM is a symmetric matrix with nonnegative
eigenvalues. Being symmetric, MTM has mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. Furthermore, for any
two eigenvectors v1 ⊥ v2 of MTM we have Mv1 ⊥Mv2.
Proof: MTM is symmetric because we have (MTM)T = MT (MT )T = MTM . For an eigenvector
v of MTM , corresponding to eigenvalue λ, the expression vTMTMv can on the one hand be
evaluated to vTλv = λ‖v‖2, and on the other hand to ‖Mv‖2 ≥ 0. This proves that λ ≥ 0.
Finally, any symmetric matrix has an orthogonal eigensystem. For two different eigenvectors v1,
v2 of M
TM , with v1 ⊥ v2, the expression vT1MTMv2 can on the one hand be evaluated to
vT1 λ2v2 = 0, and on the other hand to (Mv1)
T (Mv2). This proves Mv1 ⊥Mv2. 
Lemma 3: Let V be a set that is homeomorphic to a (higher-dimenional) ball. Let ∂V be the
boundary of V . Let f : V → V be a differentiable function such that ∂V is surjectively mapped to
∂V . Then f is surjective.
Proof sketch: A differentiable function that surjectively maps the edge ∂V to itself can deform
existing holes in V but cannot create new holes. Since V does not contain any holes, neither does
f(V). 
Lemma 4 (Arithmetic Mean - Geometric Mean (AM-GM) inequality): For any n ∈ N and any list
x1, x2, . . . , xn of nonnegative real numbers it holds that
1
n
∑n
i=1 xi ≥ n
√
x1x2 . . . xn.
3 Analysis of the asymptotic fingerprinting game
3.1 Continuum limit of the attack strategy
As in [6] we assume that the attack strategy satisfies the following condition in the limit c→∞.
There exists a set of bounded and twice differentiable functions gy : [0, 1]
q → [0, 1], with y ∈ Q,
such that
1. gα(σ/c) = θα|σ for all α, σ
2. xα = 0 implies gα(x) = 0
3.
∑
α xα = 1 implies
∑
α gα(x) = 1.
3.2 Mutual information
We introduce the notation τy|p , Prob[Y = y|P = p] =
∑
σ θy|σΛσ|p = EΣ|P=p
[
θy|Σ
]
. The
mutual information can then be expressed as:
I(Y ;Σ | P ) =
∑
y
∑
σ
θy|σΛσ|p logq
(
θy|σ
τy|p
)
(6)
where we take the base-q logarithm because we measure information in q-ary symbols. Using the
continuum assumption on the strategy we can write
I(Y ;Σ | P = p) =
∑
y
∑
σ
Λσ|pgy(
σ
c
) logq
(
gy(σ/c)
EΣ|P=p [gy(Σ/c)]
)
.
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3.3 Taylor approximation and the asymptotic fingerprinting game
For large c, the multinomial-distributed variable Σ tends towards its mean cp with shrinking
relative variance. Therefore we do a Taylor expansion2 of g around the point σc = p:
gy
(σ
c
)
= gy(p) +
1
c
∑
α
∂gy(p)
∂pα
(σα − cpα) + 1
2c2
∑
αβ
(σα − cpα)(σβ − cpβ)∂
2gy(p)
∂pα∂pβ
+ . . . (8)
We introduce the notation K for the (scaled) covariance matrix of the multinomial-distributed Σ,
Kαβ ,
1
c
Cov (Σα,Σβ) = δαβpα − pαpβ . (9)
For τy|p we then get
τy|p = EΣ|p
[
gy
(
Σ
c
)]
= gy(p) +
1
2c
∑
αβ
Kαβ
∂2gy(p)
∂pα∂pβ
+O
(
1
c
√
c
)
. (10)
The term containing the 1st derivative disappears because EΣ|p [Σ− cp] = 0. The O(1/c
√
c)
comes from the fact that (Σ− cp)n with n ≥ 2 yields a result of order cn/2 when the expectation
over Σ is taken. Now we have all the ingredients to do an expansion of I(Y ;Σ | P = p) in terms
of powers of 1c . The details are given in Appendix A.
I(Y ;Σ | P = p) = T (p)
2c ln q
+O
(
1
c
√
c
)
(11)
T (p) ,
∑
y
1
gy(p)
∑
αβ
Kαβ
∂gy(p)
∂pα
∂gy(p)
∂pβ
. (12)
Note that T (p) can be related to Fisher Information.3 The asymptotic fingerprinting game for
c→∞ can now be stated as
Cc(q) =
1
2c2 ln q
max
F
min
g
∫
F (p)T (p)dqp. (13)
3.4 Change of variables
Substitution of K (9) into (12) gives
T (p) =
∑
y
1
gy(p)


∑
α
pα
(
∂gy(p)
∂pα
)2
−
(∑
α
pα
∂gy(p)
∂pα
)2
 . (14)
Now we make a change of variables pα = u
2
α and gα(p) = γ
2
α(u), with uα ∈ [0, 1], γα(u) ∈ [0, 1].
The hyperplane
∑
α pα = 1 becomes the hypersphere
∑
α u
2
α = 1. For u on the hypersphere we
must have
∑
α γ
2
α(u) = 1. Due to the Marking Assumption, uα = 0 implies γα(u) = 0. The
change of variables induces the probability distribution Φ(u) on the variable u,
Φ(u) , F (p(u))
∏
α
(2uα). (15)
In terms of the new variables we have a much simplified expression,
T (u) =
∑
y
{
‖∇γy‖2 − (u · ∇γy)2
}
. (16)
where ∇ stands for the gradient ∂/∂u.
2 Some care must be taken in using partial derivatives ∂/∂pβ of g. The use of g as a continuum limit of θ
is introduced on the hyperplane
∑
α pα = 1, but writing down a derivative forces us to define g(p) outside the
hyperplane as well. We have a lot of freedom to do so, which we will exploit in Section 3.5.
3 We can write T (p) = Tr[K(p)I(p)], with I the Fisher information of Y conditioned on the p vector, Iαβ(p) ,∑
y
gy(p)
(
∂ ln gy(p)
∂pα
)(
∂ ln gy(p)
∂pβ
)
.
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3.5 Choosing γ outside the hypersphere
The function g(p) was introduced on the hypersphere
∑
α pα = 1, but taking derivatives ∂/∂pα
forces us to define g elsewhere too. In the new variables this means we have to define γ(u) not
only on the hypersphere ‘surface’ ‖u‖ = 1 but also just outside of this surface. Any choice will
do, as long as it is sufficiently smooth. A very useful choice is to make γ independent of ‖u‖,
i.e. dependent only on the ‘angular’ coordinates in the surface. Then we have the nice property
u · ∇γy = 0 for all y ∈ Q, so that (16) simplifies to
T (u) =
∑
α
‖∇γα‖2 (17)
and the asymptotic fingerprinting game to
Cc(q) =
1
2c2 ln q
max
Φ
min
γ
∫
Φ(u)T (u)dqu. (18)
3.6 Huang and Moulin’s next step
At this point [6] proceeds by applying the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality in a very clever way. In
our notation this gives
max
Φ
min
γ
∫
Φ(u)T (u)dqu ≥ max
Φ
1∫
1
Φ(u)d
qu
min
γ
[
∫ √
T (u)dqu]2, (19)
with equality when T is proportional to 1/Φ2. For the binary alphabet (q = 2), the integral∫ √
T (u)dqu becomes a known constant independent of the strategy γ. That makes the min-
imization over γ to disappear: The equality in (19) can then be achieved and the entire game
can be solved, yielding the arcsine bias distribution and interleaving attack as the optimum. For
q ≥ 3, however, the integral becomes dependent on the strategy γ, and the steps of [6] cannot be
applied.
4 Asymptotic solution of the alternative game
Our aim is to solve the alternative game to (18), see Section 2.5.
Cc(q) =
1
2c2 ln q
min
γ
max
u
T (u). (20)
First we prove a lower bound on maxu T (u) for any strategy γ. Then we show the existence of
a strategy which attains this lower bound. The first part of the proof is stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: For any strategy γ satisfying the Marking Assumption (uα=0 =⇒ γα(u)= 0) and
conservation of probability (‖u‖ = 1 =⇒ ‖γ(u)‖ = 1) the following inequality holds:
max
u: u≥0,‖u‖=1
T (u) ≥ q − 1. (21)
Proof: We start with the definition of the Jacobian matrix J(u):
Jαβ(u) ,
∂γα(u)
∂uβ
. (22)
In this way we can write:
T (u) = Tr(JT J). (23)
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The matrix J has rank at most q− 1, because of our choice u · ∇γy = 0 which can be rewritten as
Ju = 0. That implies that the rank of JTJ is also at most q − 1. Let λ1(u), λ2(u), . . . , λq−1(u)
be the nonzero eigenvalues of JT J . Then
T (u) =
q−1∑
i=1
λi(u). (24)
Let v1,v2, . . . ,vq−1 be the unit-length eigenvectors of JTJ and let du(1), du(2), . . ., du(q−1) be
infinitesimal displacements in the directions of these eigenvectors, i.e. du(i) ∝ vi. According to
Lemma 2 the eigenvectors are mutually orthogonal. Thus we can write the (q − 1)-dimensional
‘surface’ element dSu of the hypersphere in terms of these displacements:
dSu =
q−1∏
i=1
‖du(i)‖. (25)
Any change du results in a change dγ = Jdu. Hence we have dγ(i) = Jdu(i). By Lemma 2, the
displacements dγ(1), dγ(2), . . . , dγ(q−1) are mutually orthogonal and we can express the (q − 1)-
dimensional ‘surface’ element dSγ as
dSγ =
q−1∏
i=1
‖dγ(i)‖ =
q−1∏
i=1
√
‖Jdu(i)‖2 (26)
=
q−1∏
i=1
√
duT(i)J
TJdu(i) =
q−1∏
i=1
‖du(i)‖
√
λi (27)
= dSu
q−1∏
i=1
√
λi. (28)
We define the spatial average over u as Avu[f(u)] ,
∫
f(u) dSu/
∫
dSu. We then have
Avu[
√
λ1λ2 . . . λq−1] =
∫
dSu
√
λ1λ2 . . . λq−1∫
dSu
=
∫
dSγ∫
dSu
≥ 1 (29)
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3 applied to the mapping γ(u). (The hypersphere
orthant ‖u‖ = 1, u ≥ 0 is closed and contains no holes; the γ was defined as being twice
differentiable; the edge of the hypersphere orthant is given by the pieces where ui = 0 for some
i; these pieces are mapped to themselves due to the Marking Assumption. The edges of the
edges are obtained by setting further components of u to zero, etc. Each of these sub-edges is
also mapped to itself due to the Marking Assumption. In the one-dimensional sub-sub-edge we
apply the intermediate value theorem, which proves surjectivity. From there we recursively apply
Lemma 3 to increasing dimensions, finally reaching dimension q − 1).
Since the spatial average is greater than or equal to 1 there must exist a point u∗ where√
λ1(u∗)λ2(u∗) . . . λq−1(u∗) ≥ 1. Now we apply Lemma 4,
T (u∗) =
q−1∑
i=1
λi(u∗) ≥ (q − 1) q−1
√
λ1(u∗)λ2(u∗) . . . λq−1(u∗) ≥ q − 1. (30)
The last inequality holds since
√
x ≥ 1 implies q−1√x ≥ 1. Finally maxu T (u) ≥ T (u∗) ≥ q− 1. 
Next we show the existence of a strategy which attains this lower bound.
Theorem 2: Let the interleaving attack γ be extended beyond the hypersphere ‖u‖ = 1 as γy(u) =
uy
‖u‖ , satisfying u · ∇γy = 0 for all y. For the interleaving attack we then have T (u) = q− 1 for all
u ≥ 0, ‖u‖ = 1.
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Proof:
∂γy(u)
∂uα
=
δyα
‖u‖ −
uyuα
‖u‖3 . (31)
T (u) =
∑
y
‖∇γy(u)‖2 =
∑
y
∑
α
(
δyα
‖u‖ −
uyuα
‖u‖3
)2
(32)
=
∑
y
{
1
‖u‖2 −
u2y
‖u4‖
}
=
q − 1
‖u‖2 (33)
where we used the property δ2yα = δyα. For ‖u‖ = 1 it follows that T (u) = q − 1. 
These two theorems together give the solution of the min-max game (20). The main result of this
paper is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 3: The asymptotic fingerprinting capacity C∞c (q) in the limit c→∞ for an alphabet of
size q is given by
C∞c (q) =
q − 1
2c2 ln q
. (34)
Proof: For any strategy γ, Theorem 1 shows that maxu T (u) ≥ q − 1. As shown in Theorem 2,
the interleaving attack has T (u) = q − 1 independent of u. Hence
min
γ
max
u
T (u) = q − 1 (35)
is the solution of the min-max game. By Sion’s theorem this is also the pay-off solution to the
max-min game, as shown in Section 2.5. Substitution into (20) yields the final result. 
Remark: Any distribution function Φ(u) is an optimum of the minimax game, since T (u) is
constant for the optimal choice of γ.
5 Discussion
We have proven that the asymptotic channel capacity is C∞c (q) =
q−1
c22 ln q . This is an increasing
function of q; hence there is an advantage in choosing a large alphabet whenever the details of the
watermarking system allow it.
Some confusion may arise because of the difference between binary and q-ary symbols, and the
‘space’ they occupy in content. Therefore we explicitly mention the following. The capacity is an
upper bound on the achievable rate of (reliable) codes, where the rate measures which fraction of
the occupied ‘space’ confers actual information. The higher the fraction, the better, independent
of the nature of the symbols. Thus the rate (and channel capacity) provides a fair comparison
between codes that have different q.
The obvious next question is how to construct a q-ary scheme that achieves capacity. We expect
that a straightforward generalization of the Amiri-Tardos scheme [1] will do it. Constructions with
more practical accusation algorithms, like [14], do not achieve capacity but have already shown
that non-binary codes achieve higher rates than their binary counterparts.
When it comes to increasing q, one has to be cautious for various reasons.
• The actually achievable value of q is determined by the watermark embedding technique
and the attack mechanism at the signal processing level. Consider for instance a q = 8 code
implemented in such a way that a q-ary symbol is embedded in the form of three parts (bits)
that can be attacked independently. Then the Marking Assumption will no longer hold in
the q = 8 context, and the ‘real’ alphabet size is in fact 2.
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• A large q can cause problems for accusation schemes that use an accusation sum as in [14].
As long as the probability distributions of the accusation sums are approximately Gaussian,
the accusation works well. It was shown in [11] that increasing q causes the tails of the
probability distribution to slowly become less Gaussian, which is bad for the code rate. On
the other hand, the tails become more Gaussian with increasing c. This leads us to believe
that for this type of accusation there is an optimal q as a function of c.
The proof technique used in this paper does not reveal the asymptotically optimal bias distribution
and attack strategy. This is left as a subject for future work.
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A Taylor expansion of I(Y ;Σ | P = p)
We compute the leading order term of I(Y ;Σ | P = p) from (7) with respect to powers of 1c . We
write logq gy = ln gy/ ln q and, using (8), ln gy(σ/c) = ln[gy(p) + ǫy] = ln gy(p) + ln(1 + ǫy/gy(p)),
where we have introduced the shorthand notation
ǫy ,
1
c
∑
α
∂gy(p)
∂pα
(Σα − cpα) + 1
2c2
∑
αβ
(Σα − cpα)(Σβ − cpβ)∂
2gy(p)
∂pα∂pβ
+ . . . (36)
Higher derivative terms are omitted since they contain higher powers of 1/c (even after the expec-
tation over Σ is taken). Next we apply the Taylor expansion ln(1 + x) = x − x22 + · · · , resulting
in
ln gy(
Σ
c
) = ln gy(p) +
ǫy
gy(p)
− ǫ
2
y
2g2y(p)
+ . . . (37)
where we stop after the second order term since that is already of order 1c when we take the
expectation over Σ. Using (10) we get
ln τy|p = ln gy(p) +
ζy
gy(p)
+ . . . , (38)
ζy ,
1
2c
∑
αβ
Kαβ
∂2gy(p)
∂pα∂pβ
+O
(
1
c
√
c
)
(39)
Now we combine all the ingredients,
gy
(
Σ
c
)
ln
(
gy
(
Σ
c
)
τy|p
)
= (gy(p) + ǫy + . . .)
(
ǫy − ζy
gy(p)
− ǫ
2
y
2g2y(p)
+ . . .
)
(40)
where in the first factor we stop at ǫy because when the expectation over Σ is applied, ǫ
2
y gives at
least a factor of 1c and the terms in the second factor give at least a factor of
1√
c
.
Now EΣ|P=p [ǫy − ζy ] = 0 because EΣ|P=p [Σ− cp] = 0 and ζy was defined as the expectation
over Σ of the second term in (36). The expectation of the product EΣ|P=p [ǫyζy] is of order 1c2
and so we drop it as well. The only remaining part of order 1c in (40) is
ǫ2y
2gy(p)
and hence we end
up with:
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I(Y ;Σ | P = p)
=
1
2 ln q
∑
y
1
gy(p)
EΣ|P=p
[
ǫ2y
]
+O
(
1
c
√
c
)
(41)
=
1
2c2 ln q
∑
y
1
gy(p)
EΣ|P=p

(∑
α
∂gy(p)
∂pα
(Σα − cpα)
)2+O( 1
c
√
c
)
(42)
=
1
2c ln q
∑
y
1
gy(p)
∑
αβ
Kαβ
∂gy(p)
∂pα
∂gy(p)
∂pβ
+O
(
1
c
√
c
)
(43)
where in the second step we expanded ǫ2y and took the square of only the first term in (36) because
the other combination of terms give rise to higher powers of 1c .
